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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to identify the factors that affect the market penetration of pay 
television by studying the competition that exists between three types of technology 
(satellite, cable and ADSL). We distinguish three groups of factors: the level of market 
competition, the level of competition in the industry and the quality of the product being 
offered. Our results seem to indicate that as market concentration increases, the television 
service can achieve greater penetration. This relationship is specifically captured by the 
level of intra- and inter-platform competition. We also examine the relationship between 
free television channels and pay television and find that as the amount of time dedicated to 
the broadcasting of advertising by the former increases, the number of subscribers to pay 
TV rises. Finally, we examine product quality by introducing the effect of holding the rights 
to broadcast Professional Football League matches and an HBO or Showtime produced 
series. Our results suggest that these variables are critical for the penetration of pay 
television. 
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Competition between TV Platforms 
 
1. Introduction  
The pay TV market is changing as new technologies transform the pre-existing 
business model, while the convergence between telecommunication (fixed phones, mobile 
phones and broadband) and media services is revolutionizing competition in the market. 
This latter process, moreover, has served to remove the virtual frontier that had previously 
existed between telecommunication and media operators. Thus, today, the vast majority of 
pay TV platforms, thanks to the technological advances that they have incorporated, can 
offer duo or triple play bundling by combining broadband, telephone and television 
services1.  
In addition to these bundled packages of media and telecom services, the 
introduction of new types of program and the development of new technologies have been 
key factors in instigating market change. At the same time, content innovations have given 
rise to new programs and increased viewer interaction. The development and rapid 
consolidation of new technologies has allowed pay TV platforms to broaden their offer. 
Traditionally, the most frequently exploited system for television platforms has been cable 
(optical fiber) and satellite; however, in recent years, the platforms have shifted over to the 
same infrastructure as that used by broadband services (TV-IP or TV-xDSL2). Further, 
telecom operators have begun mobile TV broadcasts, enabling users to watch TV on their 
cell phones.  
A further change that has had a great impact on the market has been the 
introduction of digital terrestrial television (DTT) to replace analogue technology. DTT has 
led to a reorganization of TV along thematic lines so that we have seen the introduction of 
highly specific channels such as the Disney Channel and Canal Barça, Football Club 
Barcelona’s own television channel. Both channels broadcast on a pay TV platform, but 
currently viewers can tune in to these channels for free on DTT. This transfer of content 
over to pay TV platforms is indicative of the growing perception that these channels 
represent the future of the market.  
In this context, the pay TV market has consolidated itself as a major business and 
one that has become the focus of the regulators, since telecom operators offer media 
products and exploit their infrastructure to broadcast TV channels.  Thus, for example, 
                                                 
1 The telecom services can be provided by the same platform or by contract with a telecom operator.  
2 The former (TV-IP) uses an internet protocol in its broadcasting; the latter (TV-xDSL) is a group of 
communication technologies that permit the high-speed transport of information.  
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TV-IP uses the same line as that used by broadband and telephone-IP. Given this situation, 
it is important to analyze the relationship between TV penetration and bundling, and how 
the outcomes of this relationship should be incorporated in the regulation of telecom 
infrastructure.   
The aim of this paper is to analyze the factors that might influence the market 
penetration of pay TV platforms. In particular, we consider the role of competition in 
promoting the adoption of pay TV platforms and incorporate the effects of inter- and 
intra-industry competition (Distaso et al., 2006; Sohn, 2005), where inter-platform 
competition is that which exists between different technological platforms that are able to 
offer broadcast access, and intra-platform competition is that which exists between the 
same technological platform. Thus, our empirical model considers the relationship between 
the penetration of pay TV, the various forms of competition in the market as well as other 
market characteristics. 
Our results are in line with those reported elsewhere in the literature, although our 
paper provides new evidence regarding the effect of competition in the penetration of pay 
television. The low level of inter-platform competition has a marked effect on the 
penetration of pay TV platforms and indeed the pay TV market presents many 
characteristics of monopolistic competition. Such markets have high sunk costs owing to 
their levels of investment in infrastructure and the purchase of TV channels and programs. 
Consequently, if a firm enjoys a relative monopolistic power in the market, it can buy better 
channels and programs and thus recover its initial investment in infrastructure.   
Similarly, intra-platform competition also has a significant effect on the market 
penetration of pay television, with low levels of competition having a positive impact. If 
one platform can control the market, then it should be able to prevent its rivals from 
expanding. A good example of this is provided by Telefónica which offers IP-TV in the 
pay TV market. Telefónica enjoys a good company image and is the owner of the 
infrastructure for the diffusion of this pay TV format. If another firm wishes to offer IP-
TV, then it must rent the infrastructure from Telefónica, but even so it remains dependent 
on Telefónica to facilitate the connections with the consumer. Thus, we have considered it 
necessary here to incorporate and evaluate these types of competition in our empirical 
analysis.      
Other factors might also account for the penetration of pay television. Contracts 
providing exclusivity as regards content are a key variable in the introduction of a particular 
platform in the market. Subscribers will tend to contract a service with a platform that 
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offers high quality programs. Examples of premium programming are provided by a) 
National Football League, and b) Home Box Office (HBO) and Showtime series. Here, our 
results provide fresh evidence regarding the relationship between subscribers and quality 
programs. First, we observed a positive relationship between pay TV penetration and the 
broadcasting of National Football League matches on pay-per-view television. Platforms 
offering premium content show a higher degree of penetration than those that do not have 
this programming. Second, we found a positive relationship between the penetration of the 
service and the offer of HBO and Showtime premium shows. These particular companies 
have revolutionized the concept of TV through innovative program production and the 
enhanced quality of their TV series3. The origin of these changes can perhaps be traced 
back to the first series of the US drama “The Sopranos” (HBO).  
Our study also considers the quantity of advertising on free-to-air television, a 
variable not previously considered in the literature. Recent studies claim that advertising is a 
negative externality on viewers (Anderson and Coate, 2005) and so viewers tend to connect 
to a platform with little advertising. Our results show that the amount of advertising 
broadcast on free-to-air channels is an important variable in explaining the penetration of a 
pay TV platform. 
A further aspect we consider is the convergence between services4. Here our results 
seem to confirm the hypothesis that a platform that offers a bundle of television and 
telecom services will achieve greater market penetration. This can be explained by the fact 
that it is considerably easier and more attractive for a subscriber to contract all services 
based on the use of one technology.  
Interestingly, however, the market leader in Spain, Digital Plus, does not offer any 
telecommunication services. The reason for this lies in the high costs involved in operating 
satellite technology, particularly in comparison with the costs incurred by operators of 
cable and DSL. As a market alternative, in 2008, Digital Plus signed distribution 
agreements with the commercial purpose of putting out to tender its pay TV services to the 
leading telecommunication operators. Thus, we take our analysis one step further by 
seeking to explain the factors that influence the penetration of such bundled services, 
including pay television. This is clearly necessary given the increase in this mode of 
distribution of audiovisual services. Our results show that as technology expands further in 
the telecommunications sector, the greater the penetration achieved by bundled services. 
                                                 
3 Forty-five minute episodes broadcast in seasons of 24 episodes. 
4 The offering of  joint telecommunication and audiovisual services.  
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The rest of the article is organized as follows. In section 2 we analyze the market 
for pay TV in Spain. Section 3 undertakes a review of the literature. Section 4 presents our 
empirical strategy, while our data are explained in section 5. In section 6 we explain our 
results. Finally, section 7 concludes. 
 
2. The Spanish Pay TV Market 
The pay TV business is largely homogenous throughout the developed world, with 
the technologies used for its diffusion being satellite, cable and xDSL. However, the 
intensity of use of the various technologies depends on the country’s choice of 
telecommunication infrastructure. Thus, for example, Italy does not have cable television 
while Germany does not have TV-IP.  
OFCOM (2007) undertook a comparative study of the evolution in the household 
penetration of pay TV platforms in several European countries. Graph 1 shows that 
Sweden has a high level of pay TV penetration, while in Italy and Spain this level is much 
lower. The latter finding is of interest as it highlights the significant presence of free TV 
(analogue terrestrial television) in these countries of southern Europe. 
 
Graph 1. Pay TV Penetration in some European countries  
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  Source: Ofcom (2007) 
 
In recent years, technological developments in this sector have had two important 
consequences. First, there has been a marked increase in market competition and, second, 
there has been significant growth in the size of the pay TV market in Spain as well as 
elsewhere in the developed world. Our study specifically examines the Spanish pay TV 
market, but its characteristics might offer insights into the situation in other countries. 
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Graph 3 shows the evolution in the number of Spanish subscribers by the type of 
technology used.  
Graph 3. Evolution in the number of pay TV subscribers in Spain 
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 Source: Informe anual del Comisión del Mercado de las Telecomunicaciones (2006, 2007) 
 
The market was initiated with just satellite and cable platforms, but the cable 
operators enjoyed an advantage over the satellite operators as they could offer additional 
services such as broadband. However, investors were slower to put their money in the 
more expensive cable infrastructure (Artero, Herrero and Sánchez-Tabernero, 2005). 
Consequently the two satellite operators, Canal Satélite Digital and Vía Digital, acquired a 
dominant position in the market, allowing them to purchase exclusive rights on sports 
events and films from the Hollywood Production Company. Yet, despite their market 
position, the satellite operators faced considerable financial problems.  
In 2003, the two satellite operators merged creating Digital Plus (Sogecable), which 
now enjoyed a monopoly in the provision of satellite TV. Moreover, the new platform had 
exclusive rights to premium program content. However, the government, keen to maintain 
market competition, attached certain conditions to this merger including the fact that a 
number of channels were to be set aside so that they might be leased out to firms not 
owned by the platform. Bel, Calzada and Insa (2007) analyze the consequences of the 
merger for the access of independent productions in Digital Plus.  
              The cable industry has also been characterized by acquisitions and mergers, 
resulting in increased market concentration. Initially, the telecom services using cable 
infrastructure were organized into 43 demarcations. Today, only four firms operate in the 
market. The main acquisition process saw Auna Cable absorbed into Grupo ONO in 2005, 
making it the leading cable platform in Spain. The other three firms that remain in the 
market produce solely at the regional level. 
 7
The technological advances making it possible to use ADSL infrastructure to 
broadcast media content (TV channels and video on demand, for example) have been a key 
factor enabling telecom operators to enter the market. Initially, IP-TV was offered by 
Telefónica de España, the incumbent telecom operator in the Spanish market. 
Subsequently, two other telecom firms, Orange and Jazztel, have started broadcasting using 
internet protocol.   
Thus, although the market provides a broad offer of TV platforms and 
considerable competition between them, the penetration of pay TV in Spain remains low in 
comparison with other European countries, as Spanish consumers do not show a clear 
preference for pay TV. In recent years, the platforms have striven to offer more attractive 
products so as to gain more subscribers. And one way in which they have tried this is by 
launching the bundling of telecom and media services, primarily for use with cable and 
ADSL operators5.   
 
3. Literature review 
This paper analyzes the factors that account for the penetration of pay TV and 
seeks to identify the effects of competition between technologies on the penetration of this 
service. In so doing, we wish to examine the assumptions made in the theoretical literature 
and compare our results with those reported in earlier empirical studies.  
The multichannel distribution industry can be considered an example of a two-
sided market6 (Seabright and Weeds, 2006). Cable, satellite and ADSL platforms link 
subscribers, production companies and advertisers together. The relationship between 
advertisers and the platform generates a negative externality for subscribers. By contrast, 
the relationship between subscribers and the platform generates a positive externality for 
advertisers and production companies. Several studies have analyzed the pay TV industry 
in terms of this two-sided market, the best known being Reisinger (2004); Anderson and 
Coate (2005); Bel, Calzada and Insa (2007), and King, Nilssen and Søgard (2008).  
Other studies have examined the factors influencing the penetration of pay 
television. The earliest studies, including Emmons and Prager (1997), Ford and Jackson 
(1997) and Mayo and Otsuka (1991), focused their attention on the relationship between 
                                                 
5 The satellite operator does not offer bundled services, although in 2007 and 2008 it has sought to 
commercialize it products together with those of other telecom operators. 
6 Recent studies have made an increasing use of the theoretical concept of the two-sided market, which 
defines an industry in which a platform links two groups of agents. Among these agents externalities are 
generated linking them with the platform. The most recent work in this regard include Rochet and Tirole 
(2003), Evans (2003), Rysman, (2004), Anderson and Coates (2005) and Armstrong (2006). 
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price and the penetration of the service. They only considered cable platforms, as the 
sector was perhaps the most dynamic then, but in recent years alternative technologies, 
such as ADSL, have consolidated their position. 
Subsequent studies began undertaking analyses of the competition between 
platforms using different technologies and its impact on market penetration. Karikari, 
Brown and Abramowitz (2003) analyze the factors that affect TV satellite penetration, 
while considering the level of penetration achieved by cable TV in the US market. They 
adopt an econometric model to account for the penetration of satellite TV, cable TV, the 
price of the service and the number of channels offered by TV platforms. Their results 
regarding penetration point to a different set of explanatory factors in the respective cases 
of cable and satellite television. They identify a price regulation variable in the case of the 
expanded basic service of cable television which increased the penetration of cable while 
reducing the penetration of satellite television. In areas in which there was competition, the 
competitive franchise tended to be deregulated, while the non-competitive franchises were 
regulated. Hence, the low price of cable regulation was, nevertheless, sufficiently high to 
attract potential entrants, including satellite operators. 
Goolsbee and Petrin (2004) undertook an analysis of the impact of satellite TV on 
cable TV in the U.S., using subscriber data. They then estimated cross-elasticities for the 
different services, finding that satellite and the premium service offered by cable were more 
resilient than the basic cable service. They conclude that premium cable and satellite TV 
services act as close substitutes. Likewise, Kasuga, Shishikura and Kondo (2007) analyzed 
the competition between platforms in the Japanese television market in order to see how 
penetration affects market competition. They identified the advantages offered by cable 
platforms over their competitors, since the former are able to provide access to additional 
services such as the Internet. The number of channels offered by terrestrial broadcasters 
also has a significant effect on the number of subscribers to pay TV platforms. 
  Other studies have focused on analyzing the nature of competition between 
platforms. Cincera and Noury (2004) provide an empirical analysis of competition between 
the two satellite TV companies in France: the incumbent, CanalSatellite, and the entrant, 
TPS. Their purpose was to examine how the incumbent reacted to the entry of a new 
competitor. They report an increase in programming, while there was no fall in prices, 
which suggests competition in terms of quality with a fixed number of subscribers. Cincera 
and Noury find arguments, therefore, to reject collusive behavior between competitors and 
betting competition with a Stackelberg leader and a follower. 
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Sohn (2005) and Distaso et al. (2006) analyze intra- and inter-platform competition7. 
Sohn (2005) studies the role that these types of competition have played in the penetration 
of satellite pay television in the United State, Japan, England and France. Their paper 
shows that satellite TV operators behave more aggressively as they seek to minimize 
market competition. Distaso et al. (2006) analyze the impact of intra- and inter-platform 
competition on the penetration of broadband in Europe. They report a relationship 
between inter-platform competition and broadband penetration whereby broadband 
penetration increases if there is competition between xDSL and cable technology. 
However, they conclude that intra-platform competition does not affect the penetration of 
the service.  
 
4. Empirical strategy  
Our empirical approach involves estimating, on the one hand, the factors 
accounting for the penetration of pay TV and, on the other, the factors accounting for the 
penetration of the bundling of telecom and pay TV services.  In carrying out this analysis 
we establish two models in order to determine these factors. First, we explain our strategy 
for determining the factors that affect the number of subscribers, and then we explain the 
methodology used to determine the penetration of bundled services.  
The main objective of the paper is to analyze the factors accounting for the 
penetration of pay TV. To do this, we consider the relationship between the level of 
competition in the market and penetration. We include two types of competition: intra-
platform and inter-platform. Previous studies, Sohn (2005) and Distaso et al. (2006), 
conclude that, in different countries and similar markets, as is the case of the broadband 
market, inter-platform competition is a key variable in the level of competition in the 
market. By contrast, intra-platform competition does not play a significant role in the 
market.  
Our hypothesis is therefore in keeping with these previously published findings. We 
expect to find a positive relationship between the number of subscribers to pay television 
services and the degree of market concentration. And, since we observed a strong natural 
monopoly characteristic, we also expect to find that as the concentration of the intra- and 
inter-platforms increases, the number of subscribers of TV service will also rise. 
                                                 
7 Weeds (2007) analyzed the effect of the exclusivity of content on the competition between platforms. The 
study concluded that exclusivity is more likely when operators use the same technology, i.e., in instances of 
intra-platform competition. 
 
 10
We also wish to analyze how the penetration of pay TV is affected by the 
competition in TV content. Advertising is a negative externality for the viewers of free-to-
air television, so it might also be responsible for a growing trend in pay TV subscriptions. 
Our empirical model therefore incorporates the level of program content quality. We 
consider the quality of program content to be of relevance for the potential subscriber. To 
capture this effect we introduce two variables: HBO and pay-per-view football matches. 
Many pay TV subscribes typically view Professional Football League matches on the pay-
per-view service, while the HBO variable provides us with information on the quality of 
the series broadcast by the platform. 
Our study introduces a new variable not previously considered in the literature. This 
variable is a dummy variable that captures the effect of the bundling of services on the 
penetration of pay TV. In recent years, telecom operators have offered a range of services 
that include fixed telephony, broadband and TV and this bundling might make it easier to 
attract new pay TV subscribers, since this service is not as common as broadband and fixed 
telephony. Taking all the previous hypotheses into consideration, we can estimate the 
following equation:  
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The dependent variable is the number of subscribers to the platform i at time t 
(subscribers). We consider the following as explanatory variables of the number of 
subscribers to the platform:  
1. The level of intra-platform competition at time t (HHIintra). A positive sign is 
expected for the coefficient of this variable, since the greater the intra-platform 
concentration in the market, the greater the penetration of the service should be.  
2. The technological quota at time t (quotaTec). A positive sign is expected for the 
coefficient of this variable. 
3. The number of minutes of advertising broadcast by free-to-air television at time t in 
region j (advertising). In this case, we expect a positive relationship between the 
number of minutes of advertising broadcast by free-to-air television and the 
number of subscribers to the platform. We consider advertising to generate a 
negative externality for viewers and, therefore, the viewers will contract a pay TV 
service to reduce this negative externality.  
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4. The number of channels broadcast on the free-to-air television at time t in region j 
(channels). We consider that an increased supply of free-to-air channels will reduce 
the number of subscribers to pay television. 
5. The broadcasting of Professional Football League matches on pay-per-view by 
platform at time t (DPPV). A positive sign is expected because if the platform 
broadcasts these matches, subscribers will contract the pay TV service with this 
platform.   
6. The broadcasting of series produced by HBO (DHBO). Subscribers tend to contract 
the services of those pay TV platforms that offer more quality content. Therefore, 
we consider this variable to be a good approximation of the quality of content 
delivered by the platform. Thus, we expect the sign of the coefficient of this 
dummy variable to be positive. 
7. The price charged by platform user i at time t (p.user). If we control for variables of 
service quality, the variable cost per user may be charged as the costs of collecting 
the subscription service. 
8. The scale at which the platform operates, i.e. regional or otherwise (regional). The 
sign of the coefficient of this dummy variable is expected to be negative. The pay 
TV platforms operating at the regional level will have fewer subscribers than the 
platforms that operate at the national level. 
9. The effect of selling pay TV in bundles with other telecommunication services 
from the platform at time t  (Dbundles). We believe that the inclusion of television as 
part of a package of telecommunication services can facilitate the recruitment of 
service subscribers. 
Our study seeks to provide evidence concerning the penetration of bundled 
telecommunication services. We believe that such offers will become more common in 
forthcoming years as pay TV will be increasingly purchased in conjunction with other 
telecommunication services. We, therefore, believe that in order to understand the factors 
affecting the penetration of pay television, it is essential to analyze the factors affecting the 
penetration of bundled services. Here, our analysis focuses on the Spanish market at the 
provincial level in the year 2007. 
In conducting our analysis of factors affecting the penetration of bundled services at 
the regional level, we establish two equations. First, we consider the penetration of the 
combined services offered by cable operators and then propose another equation for the 
services offered by operators of ADSL. Thus, we establish that: 
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The dependent variable is the penetration of the bundled services in region i, offered 
using either cable or ADSL technology.  Below, we describe the variables used as 
explanatory variables in the penetration of bundles of telecommunication services and pay 
TV.  
1. The number of ADSL lines in region i (ADSLlines). We expect a positive 
relationship between the number of ADSL lines and the penetration of bundled 
services offered using ADSL technology, and a negative relationship with the 
penetration of bundled services offered using cable technology.   
2. The number of cable lines in region i (Cablelines). We expect a positive relationship 
between the number of cable lines and the penetration of bundled services using 
cable technology, and a negative relationship with the penetration of bundled 
services using ADSL technology.   
3. The number of free-to-view channels in region i (channels). The subscribers want to 
contract more bundled services in those regions where there is a smaller offer of 
free channels.  
4. The economic activity index of region i (economicactivityindex). The richest regions 
prefer to contract bundled services more than do the poorest regions. Thus, a 
positive sign is expected.  
5. The population of region i (population).  A positive sign is expected.   
 
5. Data 
5.1 Penetration of Pay Television   
Our dependent variable in equation (1) is the number of pay television subscribers 
in Spain. These data are reported quarterly for 2002 to 2007 and are drawn from the 
quarterly and annual reports of the Commission for the Telecommunications Market and 
its Operators. Table 1 shows the pay TV operators in the sample, the scale of their 
coverage and the technology they use. 
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Table 1 Pay TV operators in Spain 
Operators Scale of coverage Technology  
Canal satélite digital National satellite 
Vía Digital National satellite 
Digital Plus National satellite 
Euskaltel Regional 
(Basque Country) 
Cable 
Ono National Cable 
Auna National Cable 
R Cable Regional (Galicia) Cable 
Telecable de Asturias Regional (Asturias) Cable 
Telefónica de España National ADSL 
Orange National ADSL 
Jazztel  National ADSL 
     Source: authors’ own.  
 
The following are the independent variables used in equation (1).  To capture the degree of 
intra-platform competition we calculate the Herfindhal index (HHI). The variable HHI intra 
measures the degree of concentration that exists between platforms using the same 
technology for broadcasting. In other words, it reflects the level of competition within each 
technology, be it cable, satellite or ADSL. We calculated the concentration index as follows: 


 n
1i 2
2
i
raint Q
q
)n(HHI      (2) 
Furthermore, we measure the degree of inter-platform competition by the share 
each technology holds of the pay television market8. This allows us to show the degree of 
penetration made by each technology within the market. To calculate these two indices we 
used data obtained from the sources credited above. 
The variables included advertising channels and features TV. More specifically the 
advertising variable measures the number of minutes of advertising on broadcast TV. It has 
been constructed from data reported by TNS-Sofres. For national platforms, we have taken 
into account the number of minutes of advertising broadcast on public access television. In 
the case of platforms that operate only within a specific region, we used the number of 
minutes of television advertising on the regional channels, if the region had a regional 
television. This variable contains the number of channels that are broadcast on public 
access channels. In this case, we corrected this number for the regional platforms. The 
information on this variable has been obtained from TNS-Sofres and pay TV platforms. 
                                                 
8 It would have been interesting to use the HHI to measure inter-platform concentration too, but as we are 
dealing with just one country we would have encountered a lack of variability. 
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Our model introduces a variable that approximates the quality of the product 
offered by the platform. The dummy variable PPV captures the effect of owning the rights 
to broadcast the matches of the League of Professional Football in the form of a pay-per- 
view service. According to Weeds and Seabright (2006) control over the live broadcast of 
football matches has played an important role in the development of pay television in many 
countries and here Spain is no exception. The PPV variable takes the value 1 if the 
platform delivers these programs in the form of pay-per-view. 
Finally, we considered variables that reflect the characteristics of the platform. The 
variable cost per user (pmean) seeks to capture the quantity of revenue per subscriber. The 
input data have been collected from published reports by the Commission for the 
Telecommunications Market and the actual market participants. 
The regional dummy variable takes the value 1 if the platform only broadcasts at 
the regional level and the value 0 if it does so nationally. This dummy variable package has 
been designed to include the fact that some of the pay TV platforms are also 
telecommunication operators, offering fixed telephony services and a broadband TV 
service in their charges. This variable takes the value 1 if the platform provides 
telecommunication services with a combined television service. All information about 
advertising has been obtained from the operators and the Quantum database. 
Given the way in which the variables measuring competition in the market have 
been constructed, there exists a possible problem of endogeneity between these variables 
and the number of subscribers. This problem might also exist between the number of 
subscribers and the price per user. To control for this potential endogeneity problem, we 
estimate the subscriber equation by means of the two-stage least square estimator 
(IV/2SLS). As instruments, we use the number of years that the leading platform has been 
offering television (companyyears), the regulation dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
platform has a regulation governing access to its infrastructure, which includes a trend 
variable and the variable HHIintra, the quotaTec, and the price per user. We believe it to be 
important to use the variable companyyears as an instrument, since those companies that have 
been in the market for a period of years have a clearly defined brand image that has helped 
consolidate their position in the market, while at the same time they have generated a 
certain degree of market power. The regulation variable tells us if the company shares 
infrastructure with other companies in the market. ADSL companies are subject to 
regulation on their access to infrastructure, given that they all use and share Telefónica’s 
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infrastructure. Table 2 presents our descriptive statistics while Table 1 in the annex shows 
the matrix correlation.  
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Variables Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum value Maximum value 
abonados 463038.2 600625 2179 2093436 
HHIintra 0.572 0.252 0.030 1 
cuotaTec 0.361 0.208 0.006 0.872 
publicidad 177117.8 24197.38 136652 216431 
canales 4.113 1.182 3 7 
Dppv 0.915 0.279 0 1 
DHBO 0.158 0.366 0 1 
pusuario 82.537 43.924 0 218 
Dregional 0.407 0.493 0 1 
Dpaquetes 0.559 0.498 0 1 
HHIintra_1 0.566 0.255 0.029 1 
cuotaTec_1 0.362 0.210 0.006 0.872 
Pme_1 81.694 44.510 0 218 
Dregulación 0.130 0.337 0 1 
añosempresa 5.186 2.625 0 10 
 
 
5.2. Penetration of bundled services at regional level 
In equations (2) and (3) the dependent variables are the penetration of bundled 
services offered by cable operators and by those who use ADSL technology. The data are 
for 2007 and are provided at the provincial level. In this case, satellite technology is also 
considered as it does not offer bundled services. 
As explanatory variables we have introduced the number of cable lines (Cablelines) 
and ADSL (ADSLlines) in a province. The data were obtained from the Commission for 
the Telecommunications Market. The variable contains the number of channels that enjoy 
open public access in that province. We can approximate the offer of free television that 
competes with pay television. To capture the characteristics of demand in the province we 
introduced the index of industrial activity (AIindex), included in the annual La Caixa 
report, and its total population (population), obtained from at the National Institute of 
Statistics.  
 Table 3 presents our descriptive statistics while Table 2 in the annex shows the 
matrix correlations.  
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
Variables Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum value Maximum value 
penetracionCable 2.382 1.964 0 10.26 
penetracionadsl 0.862 0.513 0 2.24 
lineasCable 32219.23 40606.97 0 199635 
lineasADSL 121027.3 217484.9 1883 1193342 
canales 7.058 0.849 6 8 
indiceAE 1923.115 3039.56 94 16825 
poblacion 1738490 2198436 138880 1.22e+07 
 
6. Estimations and results 
As discussed above, equation (1) including the factors that account for the penetration of 
pay television in Spain includes variables that might be endogenous. The variables that 
measure the degree of competition in the market and the price per user would appear to be 
endogenous, and so the estimation by ordinary least squares (OLS) would be biased. To 
solve this problem we conducted the estimate by two-stage least squares using instrumental 
variables (IV/2SLS). The results are presented in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Results  
Penetration equation (dependent variable: subscribers) 
 OLS (IV/2SLS) 
HHIintra 0.139 
(0.060)** 
0.863 
(0.200) *** 
cuotaTec 0.954 
(0.080)** 
1.148 
(0.65)*** 
publicidad 1.149 
(0.299)*** 
1.042 
(0.458)** 
canales -0.011 
(0.052) 
-0.137 
(0.098) 
Dppv 5.541 
(0.367)*** 
5.493 
(0.726)*** 
DHBO 1.514 
(0.163)*** 
0.862 
(0.318)*** 
pusuario -0.721 
(0.157)*** 
-0.811 
(0.327)** 
Dregional -2.391 
(0.107)*** 
-2.170 
(0.192)*** 
Dpaquetes 0.682 
(0.086)*** 
0.566 
(0.134)*** 
Constante -2.455 
(3.592) 
0.640 
(5.640) 
N 127 122 
R2 ajustada 0.9442 0.8716 
Test F  238.02*** 93.83 *** 
Test Sargan  -- 2.678 
HHIintra 
R2 parciales Shea  
--  
0.199 
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Test F  4.53 *** 
Cuota TEC  
R2 parciales Shea  
Test F  
--  
0.665 
85.83*** 
pusuari 
R2 parciales Shea  
Test F  
--  
0.517 
33.06*** 
Note 1: Standard errors in parentheses: Robust to heterocedasticity. Note 2: *** significant at 1%; ** 
significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. Note 3: Instruments for HHIintra, Cuota TEC and  pusuari are log 
(pusuarioT-1), log( HHIintra T-1), log( CuotaTEC T-1), regulación, añosempresa and tendencia. 
  
As can be seen in our results, the OLS estimate shows a bias according to the 
estimate by IV/2SLS. Therefore, we only consider the results obtained by the IV/2SLS 
technique. Table 3 provides our results of the outcome of contract validity and the strength 
of the instruments. The Sargan test, whose null hypothesis is that the instruments are not 
correlated with the error term and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded 
from the estimated equation, accepts the validity of the instruments. We also include the 
results of the Partial Shea R-square test which measures the correlation between the 
endogenous variable and the instruments excluded, and the contrast of the F-statistic. 
The results for the two variables measuring the degree of market concentration are 
significant and show a positive relationship with the explanatory variables. Market 
concentration within the same technology (HHIintra) – i.e., a low level of intra-platform 
competition – is in our case significant and positive. We can interpret this result to indicate 
that the greater the concentration of a particular technology, the higher the level of its 
market penetration. Yet, the initial investment a company has to make in order to begin 
broadcasting using a particular technology is very high and the acquisition of content and 
this investment in infrastructure act as barriers to market entry. If there is only one 
company using a particular technology, it will be more likely to own the rights to the best 
content and to have a greater scale of coverage, since they will have acquired more 
resources to invest in infrastructure. 
The QuotaTec variable measures the share each technology holds of the pay TV 
market, i.e., the weight of each technology in the market. This variable is positive and 
significant. It might be thought that growing competition would increase the penetration of 
the service, but our results indicate that the greater share enjoys a higher penetration of the 
market. In Spain, satellite technology has traditionally been preeminent and, indeed, it was 
the first technology to expand nationwide and enjoy the advantages of being the leader, 
ensuring itself the best content. ADSL and cable technology have developed more slowly. 
Moreover, substituting one technology for another involves high costs of change. The 
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consequence of this is that when the network industry presents certain strong 
characteristics, potential competitors, even though they might be more efficient than the 
incumbents, are unable to enter the market since increased efficiency does not offset the 
costs of change (Nicita et al., 2004). 
One of the main contributions of this study is the incorporation of variables that 
reflect competition between free TV and pay television. The market that we analyze is 
characterized by the relatively low penetration of pay TV services and the stronger 
presence of free TV. Thus, first, we decided to consider the amount of advertising 
broadcast by free TV. This variable is positive and significant. The literature seems to have 
demonstrated that advertising creates a negative externality on viewers. 
In recent years, the amount of advertising time has grown because of regulatory 
changes, innovation and the increased number of free channels operating in the market. 
For these reasons, viewers have preferred to contract a pay-TV service where the amount 
of advertising is significantly less than that on free channels. Accordingly, a reduction in 
product quality offered by free television leads to the increased penetration of pay 
television. We have also included here the number of free channels. The coefficient 
associated with this variable is negative and significant. By reducing the supply of free 
channels, the number of subscribers to pay-TV platforms increases. 
The two variables that reflect the quality of the product are significant and positive. 
First, the variable DPPV, which captures the effect of broadcasting Spanish Professional 
Football League matches in pay-per-view is significant and shows a high ratio. This means 
that a platform will have more subscribers if it can offer this type of content. Secondly, and 
in line with our initial hypothesis, the variable DHBO has a significant positive effect on 
the number of users who subscribe to a pay TV service. 
Another variable included is the price per user (pusuario). This variable is not 
significant because the platforms are not competing in terms of price, although they do so 
in terms of quality. Subscribers now make their decision according to the characteristics of 
the product on offer. If a platform can differentiate their product, then it should be able to 
capture a higher number of subscribers. The regional dummy variable is significant and 
negative. As expected, if a platform’s broadcasts are restricted to just one region, it will 
have fewer subscribers. 
The variable Dbundles captures the effect of bundles supplying pay television together 
with other telecommunication services (telephone and/or broadband). Our results show 
that it is significant and positive. We are especially interested in this outcome, because 
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bundling is a relatively new practice in Spain. Such deals have become more widespread 
with the appearance in the pay TV market of telecom operators using ADSL technology. 
This result reinforces the hypothesis that the platforms are competing in terms of quality. 
In other words, they are introducing features that make their product more attractive. 
According to our results, if a company offers a pay television service together with other 
telecommunication services, then it can increase its market penetration. 
Given the present importance of bundling, we need to analyze the factors that 
influence the penetration of these services. In order to guarantee the precision of this 
analysis, we discriminated this penetration by the technology used in each platform. Note 
that the satellite platform was excluded here as it does not offer these services. 
Table 5 shows the estimation results for equations (2) and (3) in which we calculate 
a SURE estimation. Our results show that the variable number of ADSL lines in the region 
is significant in both estimations. We obtain the same result for the variable number of 
cable lines. These variables capture the telecom infrastructure that is available in the 
different regions. As noted, the number of ADSL lines in a province will have a negative 
impact on the penetration of bundled services offered by cable operators. By contrast, the 
number of cable lines available in a province will have a negative impact on the penetration 
of services offered by ADSL operators. 
The number of free channels (channels) has a negative impact on the penetration of 
the bundled service offered by cable operators. In other words, the variable has a positive 
effect on the penetration of the bundling offered by ADSL operators.  
Table 5. Estimation of bundled services  
variable SURE 
Dependent variable= PenetracionCable 
lineasadsl -0.503 
(-3.72)*** 
lineasCable 0.694 
(7.88)*** 
canales -0.262 
(-2.64)*** 
indiceAE 0.000 
(1.08) 
poblacion -0.003 
(-0.03) 
contante 1.328 
(1.06) 
R2=0,6693  
Dependent variable= penetracionADSL 
lineasADSL 0.547 
(4.41)*** 
lineasCable -0.160 
(-1.98)** 
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canales 0.044 
(0.48) 
IndiceAE 0.000 
(3.13)*** 
Poblacion -0.286 
(-3.04)*** 
R2=0,5559  
  Note: *** significant at 1% ** significant at 5% * significant at 10% 
 
7. Conclusions 
This study has sought to analyze the factors affecting the penetration of pay television 
in Spain. More specifically, we have attempted to shed some light on the relationship 
between the level of competition and the degree of penetration of the service. 
Understanding this relationship is important because the market is in a process of 
technological change, especially with the entry of the telecom operators. Thus, customers 
are being offered products that have a tendency to be similar, but which use different 
technologies. In order to make their products more attractive, companies are tending to 
bundle pay TV services together with telecommunication services. 
Our results indicate that intra- and inter-platform competition have an effect on levels 
of penetration. If the market presents low inter-platform competition, then there tends to 
be a high penetration of the service. The reason for this is that we are dealing with a market 
that has invested heavily in infrastructure and content. Being a market with natural 
monopoly characteristics, the platform with greatest market power can develop and 
amortize the high initial investment. Because of this situation, entry and consolidation in 
the market for new platforms are difficult to achieve. In the case of the Spanish market, 
new platforms, especially for TV over ADSL, have been introduced thanks to the 
possibility of adapting telecommunications technology to the dissemination of the 
audiovisual signal. 
The level of intra-platform competition plays an important role in the penetration of 
pay TV. Our results indicate that the greater the concentration achieved by a particular 
technology, the greater its penetration is likely to be. This result is due to the fact that being 
an industry with natural monopoly characteristics market concentration tends to increase 
production efficiency. Our study has also taken into account the relationship between free 
and pay TV. We have seen that as the amount of advertising on television has grown, pay 
TV has increased its penetration. According to the literature we know that advertising 
creates a negative externality, so viewers tend to choose those platforms that reduce this 
negative externality. 
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The price per user is not a significant variable in the penetration of pay television. This 
result may reflect the fact that platforms do not compete in terms of price but in terms of 
content only. This hypothesis is supported by our result for the variable that reflects the 
effect of owning the rights to broadcast Spanish Professional Football League matches in 
pay-per-view. This would seem to be a crucial variable in the penetration of pay television 
in Spain. The platforms that hold these rights enjoy greater market penetration than those 
that do not possess them. 
As expected the package variable is significant and positive. We hypothesized that the 
platforms that offer a pay television service bundled with other telecommunication services 
would have a greater number of subscribers. Our results confirm this hypothesis. This 
result has considerable implications for regulation, as the offer of services can radically 
change the shape of market competition. If telecom operators are able to offer television 
with broadband and telephony, then they can introduce a much clearer product 
differentiation. It is therefore necessary to consider the whole issue of the exclusivity of 
audiovisual content, which may change with the whole nature of competition within the 
telecommunications market. 
This study has allowed us to identify the factors that account for the penetration of 
bundled services at the provincial level. Our results show that if the operators in the 
province enjoy a high coverage, then penetration of their bid will be high. Again this has 
considerable regulatory implications, since the level achieved by infrastructure operators is 
conditioned by the regulation of telecommunications, not by the level of demand for pay 
television. 
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Annex  
Table annex 1. Matrix correlation. 
 abonados hhiintra cuotaTEC publicidad canales DPPV DHBO pusuario regional paquetes añosempresa regulación 
abonados 1            
hhiintra 0.372 1           
cuotaTEC 0.621 0.238 1          
publicidad -0.015 0.362 -0.142 1         
canales -0.469 0.177 -0.224 0.490 1        
DPPV 0.307 -0.212 0.168 -0.184 -0.125 1       
DHBO 0.628 0.561 0.689 -0.015 -0.174 0.054 1      
pusuario 0.612 0.446 0.743 0.023 -0.019 0.191 0.836 1     
Dregional -0.748 -0.388 -0.266 0.018 0.462 0.112 -0.381 -0.334 1    
Dpaquetes -0.230 -0.107 -0.506 0.168 -0.046 -0.121 -0.445 -0.449 0.231 1   
regulación -0.164 0.521 -0.451 0.280 0.101 -0.433 -0.124 -0.254 -0.258 0.279 1  
añosempresa -0.080 -0.553 -0.012 0.079 0.235 0.297 -0.404 -0.148 0.312 0.109 -0.635 1 
 
 
 
 
Table annex 2. Matrix correlation. 
 penetraciónCable penetraciónADSL lineasadsl lineascable canales indiceAE población 
penetraciónCable 1       
penetraciónADSL 0.004 1      
lineascable 0.452 0.371 1     
lineascadsl -0.036 0.553 0.628 1    
canales -0.299 0.483 0.353 0.344 1   
indiceAE 0.032 0.341 0.079 0.044 0.066 1  
población 0.016 0.331 0.062 0.026 0.063 0.083 1 
 
 
 
 
SÈRIE DE DOCUMENTS DE TREBALL DE LA XREAP 
 
 
 
 
2006 
 
 
CREAP2006-01 
Matas, A. (GEAP); Raymond, J.Ll. (GEAP) 
"Economic development and changes in car ownership patterns"  
(Juny 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-02 
Trillas, F. (IEB); Montolio, D. (IEB); Duch, N. (IEB) 
"Productive efficiency and regulatory reform: The case of Vehicle Inspection Services"  
(Setembre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-03 
Bel, G. (PPRE-IREA); Fageda, X. (PPRE-IREA) 
"Factors explaining local privatization: A meta-regression analysis"  
(Octubre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-04 
Fernàndez-Villadangos, L. (PPRE-IREA) 
"Are two-part tariffs efficient when consumers plan ahead?: An empirical study"  
(Octubre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-05 
Artís, M. (AQR-IREA); Ramos, R. (AQR-IREA); Suriñach, J. (AQR-IREA) 
"Job losses, outsourcing and relocation: Empirical evidence using microdata"  
(Octubre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-06 
Alcañiz, M. (RISC-IREA); Costa, A.; Guillén, M. (RISC-IREA); Luna, C.; Rovira, C. 
"Calculation of the variance in surveys of the economic climate”  
(Novembre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-07 
Albalate, D. (PPRE-IREA) 
"Lowering blood alcohol content levels to save lives: The European Experience”  
(Desembre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-08 
Garrido, A. (IEB); Arqué, P. (IEB) 
“The choice of banking firm: Are the interest rate a significant criteria?”  
(Desembre 2006) 
 
 
 
SÈRIE DE DOCUMENTS DE TREBALL DE LA XREAP 
 
 
 
 
CREAP2006-09 
Segarra, A. (GRIT); Teruel-Carrizosa, M. (GRIT) 
"Productivity growth and competition in spanish manufacturing firms: 
What has happened in recent years?” 
(Desembre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-10 
Andonova, V.; Díaz-Serrano, Luis. (CREB) 
"Political institutions and the development of telecommunications” 
(Desembre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-11 
Raymond, J.L.(GEAP); Roig, J.L.. (GEAP) 
"Capital humano: un análisis comparativo Catalunya-España” 
(Desembre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-12 
Rodríguez, M.(CREB); Stoyanova, A. (CREB) 
"Changes in the demand for private medical insurance following a shift in tax incentives” 
(Desembre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-13 
Royuela, V. (AQR-IREA); Lambiri, D.; Biagi, B.  
"Economía urbana y calidad de vida. Una revisión del  estado del conocimiento en España” 
(Desembre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-14 
Camarero, M.; Carrion-i-Silvestre, J.LL. (AQR-IREA).;Tamarit, C.  
"New evidence of the real interest rate parity for OECD countries using panel unit root tests with breaks” 
(Desembre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-15 
Karanassou, M.; Sala, H. (GEAP).;Snower , D. J.  
"The macroeconomics of the labor market: Three fundamental views” 
(Desembre 2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SÈRIE DE DOCUMENTS DE TREBALL DE LA XREAP 
 
 
2007 
 
 
XREAP2007-01 
Castany, L (AQR-IREA); López-Bazo, E. (AQR-IREA).;Moreno , R. (AQR-IREA)  
"Decomposing differences in total factor productivity across firm size” 
(Març 2007) 
 
 
XREAP2007-02 
Raymond, J. Ll. (GEAP); Roig, J. Ll. (GEAP) 
“Una propuesta de evaluación de las externalidades de capital humano en la empresa" 
(Abril 2007) 
 
 
XREAP2007-03 
Durán, J. M. (IEB); Esteller, A. (IEB) 
“An empirical analysis of wealth taxation: Equity vs. Tax compliance” 
 (Juny 2007) 
 
 
XREAP2007-04 
Matas, A. (GEAP); Raymond, J.Ll. (GEAP) 
“Cross-section data, disequilibrium situations and estimated coefficients: evidence from car ownership 
demand” 
 (Juny 2007) 
 
 
XREAP2007-05 
Jofre-Montseny, J. (IEB); Solé-Ollé, A. (IEB) 
“Tax differentials and agglomeration economies in intraregional firm location” 
 (Juny 2007) 
 
 
XREAP2007-06 
Álvarez-Albelo, C. (CREB); Hernández-Martín, R.  
“Explaining high economic growth in small tourism countries with a dynamic general equilibrium model” 
 (Juliol 2007) 
 
 
XREAP2007-07 
Duch, N. (IEB); Montolio, D. (IEB); Mediavilla, M. 
“Evaluating the impact of public subsidies on a firm’s performance: a quasi-experimental approach” 
 (Juliol 2007) 
 
 
XREAP2007-08 
Segarra-Blasco, A. (GRIT) 
“Innovation sources and productivity: a quantile regression analysis” 
 (Octubre 2007) 
 
 
 
 
SÈRIE DE DOCUMENTS DE TREBALL DE LA XREAP 
 
 
 
 
XREAP2007-09 
Albalate, D. (PPRE-IREA) 
“Shifting death to their Alternatives: The case of Toll Motorways” 
 (Octubre 2007) 
 
 
XREAP2007-10 
Segarra-Blasco, A. (GRIT); Garcia-Quevedo, J. (IEB); Teruel-Carrizosa, M. (GRIT) 
“Barriers to innovation and public policy in catalonia” 
 (Novembre 2007) 
 
 
XREAP2007-11 
Bel, G. (PPRE-IREA); Foote, J.  
“Comparison of recent toll road concession transactions in the United States and France” 
 (Novembre 2007) 
 
 
XREAP2007-12 
Segarra-Blasco, A. (GRIT);  
“Innovation, R&D spillovers and productivity: the role of knowledge-intensive services” 
 (Novembre 2007) 
 
 
XREAP2007-13 
Bermúdez Morata, Ll. (RFA-IREA); Guillén Estany, M. (RFA-IREA), Solé Auró, A. (RFA-IREA) 
“Impacto de la inmigración sobre la esperanza de vida en salud y en discapacidad de la población 
española” 
 (Novembre 2007) 
 
XREAP2007-14 
Calaeys, P. (AQR-IREA); Ramos, R. (AQR-IREA), Suriñach, J. (AQR-IREA) 
“Fiscal sustainability across government tiers” 
 (Desembre 2007) 
 
XREAP2007-15 
Sánchez Hugalbe, A. (IEB) 
“Influencia de la inmigración en la elección escolar” 
 (Desembre 2007) 
 
SÈRIE DE DOCUMENTS DE TREBALL DE LA XREAP 
 
 
2008 
 
 
XREAP2008-01 
Durán Weitkamp, C. (GRIT); Martín Bofarull, M. (GRIT) ; Pablo Martí, F. 
“Economic effects of road accessibility in the Pyrenees: User perspective” 
(Gener 2008) 
 
XREAP2008-02 
Díaz-Serrano, L.; Stoyanova, A. P. (CREB) 
“The Causal Relationship between Individual’s Choice Behavior and Self-Reported Satisfaction: the Case 
of Residential Mobility in the EU” 
(Març 2008) 
 
XREAP2008-03 
Matas, A. (GEAP); Raymond, J. L. (GEAP); Roig, J. L. (GEAP) 
“Car ownership and access to jobs in Spain” 
(Abril 2008) 
 
XREAP2008-04 
Bel, G. (PPRE-IREA) ; Fageda, X. (PPRE-IREA) 
“Privatization and competition in the delivery of local services: An empirical examination of the dual 
market hypothesis” 
(Abril 2008) 
 
XREAP2008-05 
Matas, A. (GEAP); Raymond, J. L. (GEAP); Roig, J. L. (GEAP)  
“Job accessibility and employment probability” 
(Maig 2008) 
 
XREAP2008-06 
Basher, S. A.; Carrión, J. Ll. (AQR-IREA) 
Deconstructing Shocks and Persistence in OECD Real Exchange Rates  
(Juny 2008) 
 
XREAP2008-07 
Sanromá, E. (IEB); Ramos, R. (AQR-IREA); Simón, H.  
Portabilidad del capital humano y asimilación de los inmigrantes. Evidencia para España 
(Juliol 2008) 
 
XREAP2008-08 
Basher, S. A.; Carrión, J. Ll. (AQR-IREA) 
Price level convergence, purchasing power parity and multiple structural breaks: An application to US 
cities 
(Juliol 2008) 
 
XREAP2008-09 
Bermúdez, Ll. (RFA-IREA) 
A priori ratemaking using bivariate poisson regression models 
(Juliol 2008) 
 
 
SÈRIE DE DOCUMENTS DE TREBALL DE LA XREAP 
 
 
XREAP2008-10 
Solé-Ollé, A. (IEB), Hortas Rico, M. (IEB) 
Does urban sprawl increase the costs of providing local public services? Evidence from Spanish 
municipalities 
(Novembre 2008) 
 
XREAP2008-11 
Teruel-Carrizosa, M. (GRIT), Segarra-Blasco, A. (GRIT) 
Immigration and Firm Growth: Evidence from Spanish cities 
(Novembre 2008) 
 
XREAP2008-12 
Duch-Brown, N. (IEB), García-Quevedo, J. (IEB), Montolio, D. (IEB) 
Assessing the assignation of public subsidies: Do the experts choose the most efficient R&D projects? 
(Novembre 2008) 
 
XREAP2008-13 
Bilotkach, V., Fageda, X. (PPRE-IREA), Flores-Fillol, R. 
Scheduled service versus personal transportation: the role of distance 
(Desembre 2008) 
 
XREAP2008-14 
Albalate, D. (PPRE-IREA), Gel, G. (PPRE-IREA) 
Tourism and urban transport: Holding demand pressure under supply constraints 
 (Desembre 2008) 
 
 
SÈRIE DE DOCUMENTS DE TREBALL DE LA XREAP 
 
 
2009 
 
 
XREAP2009-01 
Calonge, S. (CREB); Tejada, O. 
“A theoretical and practical study on linear reforms of dual taxes” 
(Febrer 2009) 
 
XREAP2009-02 
Albalate, D. (PPRE-IREA); Fernández-Villadangos, L. (PPRE-IREA) 
“Exploring Determinants of Urban Motorcycle Accident Severity: The Case of Barcelona” 
(Març 2009) 
 
XREAP2009-03 
Borrell, J. R. (PPRE-IREA); Fernández-Villadangos, L. (PPRE-IREA) 
“Assessing excess profits from different entry regulations” 
(Abril 2009) 
 
XREAP2009-04 
Sanromá, E. (IEB); Ramos, R. (AQR-IREA), Simon, H.  
“Los salarios de los inmigrantes en el mercado de trabajo español. ¿Importa el origen del capital 
humano?” 
(Abril 2009) 
 
XREAP2009-05 
Jiménez, J. L.; Perdiguero, J. (PPRE-IREA) 
“(No)competition in the Spanish retailing gasoline market: a variance filter approach” 
(Maig 2009) 
 
XREAP2009-06 
Álvarez-Albelo,C. D. (CREB), Manresa, A. (CREB), Pigem-Vigo, M. (CREB) 
“International trade as the sole engine of growth for an economy” 
(Juny 2009) 
 
XREAP2009-07 
Callejón, M. (PPRE-IREA), Ortún V, M. 
“The Black Box of Business Dynamics” 
(Setembre 2009) 
 
XREAP2009-08 
Lucena, A. (CREB) 
“The antecedents and innovation consequences of organizational search: empirical evidence for Spain” 
(Octubre 2009) 
 
XREAP2009-09 
Domènech Campmajó, L. (PPRE-IREA) 
“Competition between TV Platforms” 
(Octubre 2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xreap@pcb.ub.es 
